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SPILLS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND STATE
NULLIFICATION
Russell V. Randle*

In May 2010, at President Obama’s request, outgoing Coast Guard
Commandant Thad Allen delayed his retirement and became National
Incident Commander for the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
serving until the conclusion of the emergency at the end of September
2010. From that experience, Admiral Allen observed what he called
“social and political nullification” of the National Contingency Plan
(NCP) arising from public hostility to the responsible party and demands
of state and local political officials for more active roles in the response.1
The NCP2 is the federal regulation governing oil and hazardous
substance response under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),3 the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA),4 popularly known as Superfund, and section 311 of the
federal Clean Water Act.5 If that rule works poorly in practice, as
Admiral Allen’s comments suggest, then addressing “nullification”
issues will be important for responding better to future large-scale oil
spills and avoiding or reducing environmental damage and economic
losses.

* Member, District of Columbia Bar; author, ELI OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK; ViceChair, ABA Superfund Committee; partner, Patton Boggs LLP, Washington, D.C. The
views expressed are the author’s own and not necessarily those of his firm or his firm’s
clients.
1. NAT’L OIL SPILL COMM’N MEETING, NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION ON BP
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 44, 46 (2010), available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript%20Meeting%203.pdf [hereinafter ALLEN TESTIMONY] (statement of Admiral Thad
Allen, U.S. Coast Guard, National Incident Commander for the Unified Command).
2. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (2010).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
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Admiral Allen was uniquely situated to comment on such disaster
response and problems with the NCP. Before his service as incident
commander, he led the federal response to Hurricane Katrina and
oversaw a 2002 simulation of government capacities to respond to a spill
of national significance off the Louisiana coast.6 He made his
“nullification” comments in September 2010 testimony before the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling (National Commission).7 He explained that demands
by state and local officials and the public resulted in substantial changes
in the actual response from the approach dictated by the NCP. Some of
these changes, the National Commission claims, resulted in costly and
ineffective responses, overlapping and conflicting efforts, and diversion
of response equipment and personnel from locations which needed the
equipment most urgently.
This article uses Admiral Allen’s observations and subsequent
reporting by the National Commission to highlight “nullification” and
other problems with the spill response, to identify correctible sources of
these problems, and to suggest changes to the NCP and related authority
recommended to help resolve nullification and related problems. I leave
to other authors the discussion of environmental impact reviews of
offshore leasing decisions and drilling permits.
The NCP and disaster response issues addressed here include
•

•

•

assigning the lead cleanup role to the responsible party for a
spill of national significance raised serious questions about
the party’s competence, credibility, and culpability. These
questions were further reinforced by the absence of
significant in-house federal spill response capability;
elected state and local officials were poorly integrated into
the spill response, and they initially understood the response
procedures poorly. These elected officials demanded and
eventually played a much more active role than initially
assigned them. A similar political dynamic should be
expected in future spills, requiring much greater inclusion of
state and local elected officials in planning, practicing, and
implementing future spill responses;
outside government, academic, and industry technical
experts were poorly integrated into response efforts.

6. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING 136-137 (2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION].
7. See ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 44.
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Similarly, the federal government initially lacked an
independent source of information about the volume and
flow rate of the discharge. Far more robust federal technical
expertise, independent sources of key information, and
capable outside oversight contractors will be needed to
maintain public confidence in future responses to spills of
national significance.
I. RESPONSIBLE PARTY ISSUES
A. Cleanup under the NCP
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act governs oil spill cleanups.8 Its
allocation of duties has changed little since first enacted in 1970 in
response to the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.9 The federal government
has broad powers under the Act to respond to discharges or threats of
discharge of oil or hazardous substances in navigable waters or
shorelines,10 including the authority to “remove, and if necessary, destroy
a vessel discharging, or threatening to discharge, by whatever means are
available.”11 These powers are to be exercised “in accordance with the
National Contingency Plan and any appropriate Area Contingency
Plan.”12
Private parties, including an “owner or operator participating in
[removal] efforts . . . shall act in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan and the applicable response plan,” which may include
the Area Contingency Plan and the Facility Response Plan, both required
under section 311(j).13 The Facility Response Plan should respond “to
the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case, discharge . . . of oil.”14
The liability provisions of OPA make “responsible” parties such as
an offshore oil lease holder like BP strictly liable for “removal costs,”15
i.e., the costs of containing and cleaning up the spill. Consistent with
this financial obligation, the NCP provides that the responsible party may
be permitted to undertake the response as directed by the On-Scene

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

33 U.S.C. § 1321.
Compare Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 2, 84 Stat. 100 (1970), with 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(c).
Id. § 1321(c)(1)(B)(iii).
Id. § 1321(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 1321(c)(3)((B).
Id. § 1321(j)(5)(A).
33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
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Coordinator, consistent with the provisions of the NCP.16 Under OPA,
the federal government may conduct the cleanup itself and send the bill
to the responsible party, although that is not the preferred approach in
practice.
Private parties, in fact, conduct most spill cleanups under federal
supervision. This was the approach reportedly used in Louisiana before
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, an approach which appeared to work
well.17
The 1990 OPA statute amended section 311(b) to add strong federal
authority to order private party response efforts. A court may impose
severe penalties on any responsible party who “without sufficient cause”
fails to properly carry out removal of the discharge under a federal
order.18 This approach is quite consistent with the “polluter pays”
approach under federal Superfund, which was used as a model for many
of the OPA provisions. Most Superfund cleanups are conducted by
potentially responsible parties pursuant to consent agreements or
administrative orders.
B. Conflicting Roles
Admiral Allen testified that this system had worked well for twenty
years after the enactment of OPA but broke down in the extreme
circumstances of the Deepwater Horizon spill: “I think the public’s
tolerance for a responsible party is inversely proportional to the size of
the spill.”19
The large size of the spill, the loss of life, and the
spectacular nature of the casualty inevitably raised questions about the
“responsible party’s” competence, culpability, and credibility. The
atrophy of federal spill response capability reinforced these questions.
1. Why Do We Think the Party Who Created This Mess Can Fix It?
The public and the press reacted badly to the prominent role BP was
playing as the “responsible party,” as it had been legally designated at
16. 40 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(3) (2010).
17. NAT’L OIL SPILL COMM’N MEETING, NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION ON BP
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 110-112 (2010), available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript%20Meeting%203.pdf [hereinafter STANTON TESTIMONY] (statement of Captain Edward
Stanton, New Orleans, U.S. Coast Guard).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(B)(i), noted in ENVTL. LAW INST., OIL POLLUTION
DESKBOOK 12 (1991).
19. See ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 43.
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the outset of the spill response. This skepticism was understandable.
The explosion, the fire, the loss of the rig, the death of eleven crewmen,
and the injury of even more made for spectacular television. That
spectacle was followed by distressing footage of large volumes of oil
coming to the surface and the increasingly frantic stories about the
failure to contain it. People reasonably wondered why the party
“responsible” for creating this dramatic disaster was believed to be
competent to implement the remedy, even under Coast Guard
supervision.
2. Why Is the Government Putting A Criminal Suspect in Charge of
Public Safety?
Justice Department guidance for criminal prosecutions in
environmental cases has made clear for more than two decades that
criminal investigations are in order where lives are lost, serious
environmental damage occurs, or there is widespread public attention to
the matter.20 In this instance, all three factors favoring criminal
investigation were present. Without identifying BP, Attorney General
Eric Holder confirmed the fact of such a criminal investigation,21 a
confirmation which should have surprised no one.
The tension between OPA’s strict liability approach and the Justice
Department’s criminal prosecution guidance became quite apparent in
this case, begging the question: Why should a party under criminal
investigation for possible misconduct in causing the spill be leading the
spill response? In BP’s case, that question became more pointed because
of past criminal proceedings arising out of the 2005 explosion at BP’s
Texas City, Texas refinery, in which fifteen workers were killed and
many more injured, as well as earlier proceedings arising out of oil spill
problems on Alaska’s North Slope.22

20. See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of
Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
1223, 1246-47 (2009) (noting examples of prosecutions where significant environmental
damage or fatalities have occurred).
21. Matt Grutman & Bradley Blackburn, Attorney General Eric Holder Announces
Criminal Investigation into Gulf Oil Spill, ABC NEWS, June 1, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-gulf-oil-spill-cut-cap-beginspresident/story?id=10797393.
22. Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, a History of Boldness and Costly Blunders, N.Y.
TIMES,
July
12,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energyenvironment/13bprisk.html.
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3. Why Should Anyone Believe the Responsible Party?
The safety and environmental record of offshore oil drilling have
been controversial political issues since the Santa Barbara Oil Spill in
1969. For several decades, the federal government has restricted or
forbidden oil drilling off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the lower
forty-eight states, and off of the Florida Gulf Coast. The oil industry and
its supporters argued for many years that offshore safety records had
greatly improved over the offshore safety records in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. The industry had considerable operating experience to
support that argument. These arguments were making political headway
in 2010: President Obama endorsed increased offshore drilling on March
31, 2010.23 Three weeks later, the Deepwater Horizon exploded and
sank, prompting many second thoughts.
Any company suffering this disaster would have encountered
increased skepticism, given the political history and heated past
arguments. These credibility problems grew worse as successive efforts
to control the well failed. Public reaction seemed to alternate between
ridicule and rage.24
4. Why Doesn’t the Federal Government Conduct the Cleanup?
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act not only authorizes, but requires
the federal government to respond to oil spills.25 Despite the addition of
such mandatory language in 1990, the great depth of this discharge
meant that the federal government lacked the in-house equipment,
personnel, and expertise to take over the Deepwater Horizon cleanup
operation. According to the Commission Report, when Secretary of the
Interior Salazar asked staff at the Minerals Management Service (MMS)
what they would do if the government took over the cleanup, he was

23. John M. Broder, Obama to Open Offshore Areas to Drilling for First Time, N. Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/science/earth/31energy.html.
24. One particular satiric video reportedly had over eleven million views by midFebruary
2011.
UBCcommedy.com,
BP
Spills
Coffee,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AAa0gd7ClM (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). Public
outrage was the theme of a number of stories. E.g., Kristin Jensen & Jim Snyder, BP
Hires Army of Washington Insiders to Help Manage Outrage Over Oil Spill, BLOOMBERG
(June 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/bp-hires-army-ofwashington-insiders-to-help-manage-outrage-over-oil-spill.html.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(A) (2006).
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advised that the MMS would have to contract with a major oil company
to carry out the work.26
The absence of this independent federal response capability
reinforced the public impression that regulators were much too close to
the offshore oil industry they were supposed to regulate. Past scandals
with MMS personnel accepting drugs and sexual favors from industry
counterparts27 made the impression worse. Reliance on BP and its
contractors for most of the cleanup effort was an unpleasant necessity,
resulting from the failure of the federal government to build the capacity
to respond to such deepwater spills, not from a careful choice between
capable public and private party response teams.
II. FEDERAL ROLES: THEORY AND REALITY
A. Legal Theory: Federal Preeminence in Oil Spill Cleanup
Although OPA tracks many Superfund provisions,28 a comparison
between Superfund statutory language and OPA/Clean Water Act section
311 language shows that Congress expected state and local governments
to play a much less active role in maritime oil spill response actions than
such governments play in responding to Superfund sites on shore. For
example, CERCLA section 104(d) provides for cooperative agreements
between states and the federal government, under which states are
reimbursed for much of their effort to conduct Superfund response
actions.29 The federal government is ordinarily obliged to defer placing a
site on the National Priority List (NPL) for Superfund cleanup if the state
is conducting an adequate cleanup and requests such deferral.30 Note that
NPL sites are the most severely contaminated ones under CERCLA and
qualify for long-term remedial action. CERCLA also provides elaborate
procedures to assure state involvement in determining what sites are
placed on the NPL in that state, as well as in the choice of remedy and
the allocation of liability for the site.31
By contrast, neither OPA nor section 311 of the federal Clean Water
Act requires such elaborate consultation with and deferral to the states.
26. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 136.
27. Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09//11/ washington/11royalty.html.
28. ENVTL. LAW REPORTER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, OIL POLLUTION
DESKBOOK 3 (1991).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c )(5), (d) (2006).
30. Id. § 9605(h).
31. Id. § 9621(f).
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Instead, section 311(d) of the Clean Water Act establishes the
requirements for the NCP, with a far stronger emphasis on federal
References to state and local agencies concern
response.32
“coordination” and providing for reimbursement for certain state
response activities.33 While state and local governments are expected to
be participants in Area Committees and Area Contingency Plans, the
President appoints the members “from qualified personnel of Federal,
State, and local agencies.”34 There is no formal role for state and local
elected officials. The Gulf Strike Team’s informal handbook “An
FOSC’s Guide to Environmental Response” mentions governors only
once as someone to be notified of a spill.35
Area Contingency Plans are to be implemented “in conjunction with
the National Contingency Plan,” and to detail the “responsibilities of an
owner or operator and of Federal, State, and local agencies in removing a
discharge,” identify the most sensitive areas, list available equipment,
dispersants and personnel available to address the discharge, as well as
local scientists “with expertise in the environmental effects of spills of
the types of oil typically transported in the area.”36 The Area
Contingency Plan was also supposed to be integrated into offshore
facility response plans, such as the one for the Deepwater Horizon.37
B. Federal Preeminence, Federal Nonfeasance
While the Coast Guard was responsible for both the National and
Area Contingency Planning efforts and response efforts, the MMS at the
Department of the Interior was responsible for the review and approval
of the facility plan for the Deepwater Horizon. MMS did this job
without any interagency review of the plan or the MMS proposed
approval of it.
Section 311 required that the facility plan “identify, and ensure by
contract or other means approved by the President the availability of,
private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum
extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge resulting

32. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (2006).
33. Id. § 1321(d)(2)(A), (H).
34. Id. § 1321(j)(4)(A).
35. THE GULF STRIKE TEAM, AN FOSC’S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE 36
(2008), available at www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfweb/docs/FOSCGuidev07.pdf.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(C).
37. Id. § 1321(j)(4)(C)(vi).
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from fire or explosion) . . . .”38 Such plans were required to be updated
periodically and resubmitted for approval with each significant change.39
As the National Commission’s Report documents, and as quickly
became apparent, the facility plan failed to work: “BP’s oil-spill response
plan for the Gulf of Mexico claimed that response vessels provided by
the Marine Spill Response Corporation and other private oil-spill
removal organizations could recover nearly 500,000 barrels of oil per
day. Despite these claims, the oil-spill removal organizations were
quickly outmatched.”40 The Interior Department could not have
performed the most basic due diligence on the plan before approving it;
two comic mistakes showed that the plan was badly out of date and not
tailored to Gulf waters:
•
•

it listed as a key emergency consultant someone who had
been dead for several years when the plan was submitted;
it referred to protection of seals and walruses, creatures not
found in the Gulf of Mexico in human memory. 41

More fundamentally, the plan failed to take the possibility of a
catastrophic well blowout seriously enough and to require adequate
preparations to address such a disaster. Despite the large scale of this
and other deepwater drilling operations in the Gulf, those approving the
plan omitted Coast Guard review or consultation with any other agency
about the plan’s sufficiency.
Consequently, the mistaken plan
assumptions remained unexamined by the most knowledgeable response
agencies.
III. ROLES FOR STATE AND LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS
A. Failure to Include Local Elected Officials
Admiral Allen testified that he had participated in an April 2002 drill
for a “spill of national significance” (SONS) as the incident
commander.42 That drill had taken place in the New Orleans Superdome
and had assumed a well blow-out about eighty miles west of where the
Deepwater Horizon sank eight years later.43 In retrospect, Admiral Allen

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. §1321(j)(5)(D)(iii).
Id. §1321(j)(5)(D)(v), (vi).
NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 132.
Id. at 133.
ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 37.
Id.
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explained that while that 2002 drill had seemed to go “pretty well,”
experience with the Deepwater Horizon now led him to believe that
fundamental changes in area contingency planning had to be made.44
The Admiral’s critique focused on the absence of local officials and the
mistaken assumption that state officials could speak for local interests in
deciding response actions:
The entire exercise was conducted with a State of Louisiana
representative, and there were no parishes present. We know
now that if you’re going to interact with state and local
responders at a local level – and it can be a county in Mississippi
or a parish in Louisiana – that as part of the contingency
planning process, the designation of sensitive areas, the
negotiation of protocols for dispersant use, in situ burning, and
so forth, that has to be taken down to the local government level
where the responders are going to be interacting with on an
actual spill. We can’t always rely on the fact that this will be
integrated at the state level and that the state will speak with one
voice for all the political interests of the state.45
One example of unresolved local conflicts he cited concerned
whether to give greater protection to marshes or beaches.46 The
contingency plans made marsh protection a priority because of their
sensitivity and the difficulty cleaning them.47 Beaches are much easier to
clean so “there is a presumption in response doctrine that you will push
oil to a beach because it can be recovered there.”48 Admiral Allen
testified that this is “not universally agreed within the Gulf,” in part
because of economic losses to beachfront communities. 49
According to the National Commission’s Report, parishes and
counties made noisy and conflicting demands for booms and skimmers,
and for their deployment in places where they would not work or not
work very well.50 These demands sometimes caused the allocation of
these resources based on political demands rather than the most urgent
need.51 These were tangible local “nullifications” of the contingency
plans, sometimes hindering rather than helping the overall response.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 153.
Id. at 154.
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Much of this controversy resulted from the failure to include local
elected officials in the earlier planning efforts. These elected leaders had
no stake in those earlier plans: as the National Commission’s Report
noted, when one state official was told he was departing from the
previously approved contingency plan, he said simply that he had not
signed it.52
These elected leaders had angry constituents demanding immediate
action to protect their parishes, counties, beaches, and fishing grounds,
and they saw an inadequate and, at times, bumbling response by BP and
the federal government. These elected officials had every incentive to
ignore or denigrate contingency plans which seemed to be working very
badly, and to push hard to protect local interests. These officials’ lack of
familiarity with some aspects of oil spill cleanup also led them to
demand steps which were ineffective, such as trying to boom waterways
where strong tidal flows predictably moved oil past the booms.53 Despite
these problems, these local leaders might reasonably argue that their
constituents might forgive their mistakes, but not their inaction, and that,
it in any event, it would be hard to do a worse job than BP appeared to be
doing.
B. Conflicts with Other Emergency Procedures
Admiral Allen and other witnesses before the National Commission
explained that elected officials in the Gulf were far more familiar with
emergency procedures under the Stafford Act, used in order to respond to
hurricanes and other disasters.54 Under the Stafford Act, the President
acts on a governor’s request for a disaster declaration; once the President
does so, state and local governments generally take the lead in
responding, using federal financial assistance to help pay for the
response efforts.55 That approach is quite familiar to state and local

52. Id. at 139.
53. Id. at 154.
54. ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 34 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5195 (2006));
NAT’L OIL SPILL COMM’N MEETING, NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION ON BP DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 66-67 (2010), available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript%20Meeting%203.pdf [hereinafter HARRELL TESTIMONY] (statement of Richard Harrell,
On-Scene Commander for Alabama).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5195 (2006).
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governments in the Gulf, both from actual experience and from annual
Gulf-wide hurricane drills in which they participate.56
By contrast, the federal government is clearly in control of OPA
response efforts. OPA and section 311 contemplate rapid seaborne
responses which states are not equipped to handle and which require the
on-scene commander (OSC) to make quick decisions without waiting to
consult “chairborne” superiors on shore, much less state and local
politicians untrained in commanding a vessel or leading a dangerous
maritime rescue operation. The statute expressly contemplates responses
as dramatic as sinking a vessel where the OSC considers such steps
necessary.57 In keeping with this approach, Admiral Allen explained that
he viewed his role as National Incident Commander as being responsible
for dealing with high level political and policy issues, while avoiding
micromanagement of officers on the scene.58
Nine days after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, as it became
apparent that the combined BP and federal response was failing to
contain the discharge, Governor Jindal of Louisiana declared a state of
emergency, followed the next day by such declarations from Mississippi,
Alabama, and Florida.59 As the Commission Report explained:
At the outset of the spill, the pre-designated State On-Scene
Coordinators for Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi
participated in the Unified Command. These officials were
career oil-spill responders: familiar with the National
Contingency Plan, experienced in responding to spills, and
56. HARRELL TESTIMONY, supra note 54, at 68. The blundering response of all levels
of government to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 illustrates some of the severe limitations of
the Stafford Act approach. The Bush Administration was severely condemned for its
failure to federalize the response to the Hurricane without waiting for requests from the
State of Louisiana. Ironically, President Bush asked Admiral Allen to take command of
the federal response from the FEMA director when the federal disaster relief effort
faltered so badly in the first days after Katrina. The political lesson of Katrina is that
neither the public nor the press has patience with jurisdictional issues when the
substantive response fails to work quickly, effectively, and visibly.
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
58. See ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that “as a 39-year veteran of
the Coast Guard, the last thing anybody wants is what we would call the 3,000-mile
screwdriver making adjustments and changes. So one of the first principles was that we
would leave tactical control as close to the problem as we could, and that we would try
and develop awareness in Washington. And then the staff and myself would travel back
and forth, which we did, weekly, to not only see what was going on on-scene downrange,
but also to take care of the extraordinary amounts of data required to brief up to the
various levels of government and to deal with the media as well”).
59. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 138.
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accustomed to working with the Coast Guard. Some had
participated in the 2002 spill exercise run by Admiral Allen.
They shared the Coast Guard’s view that the responsible party is
an important ally, not an adversary, in responding to a spill . . .
[with unprecedented state involvement] State and local officials
largely rejected the pre-spill plans and began to create their own
response structures.60
The states as well as affected parishes and counties set up their own
response centers, duplicating existing procedures and slowing down
decisions needed in the response.61 The states and localities demanded
and received money from BP to help fund these efforts.62 The Coast
Guard eventually assigned liaison personnel to these additional command
centers in order to improve coordination.63 Despite the untidiness and
fragmentation of the state and local responses, the state and local
emergency declarations resulted in mobilization of additional response
personnel and resources, including the National Guard.64
The conflicting state and local responses were sometimes chaotic.
At that point in the response effort, however, neither BP nor the federal
government could claim that their combined response was stopping or
containing the discharge. From the governors’ perspective, they needed
to take local command because of the failure of federal efforts. As for
the criticism that the procedures had not been blessed in advance by the
Area Contingency Plan, the governors could reasonably claim that such
independence of the failed federal effort was a virtue, not a defect.
Politically, establishing state independence from both the federal
government and more particularly from BP was an additional virtue.
The turmoil also provided Louisiana the opportunity to press for
federal approval and BP financing to build many miles of sand berms to
protect barrier islands. The sand berm idea had originally been advanced
before the spill to address the alarming loss of wetlands along the
Louisiana coastline, an issue made acute by Hurricane Katrina.65
Although federal reviewers argued that the proposed construction could
not be completed in time to prevent oil from reaching the shorelines and
might do more environmental harm than good, Governor Jindal and local
60. Id. at 138-139.
61. Id. at 139.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. STANTON TESTIMONY, supra note 17, at 60; HARRELL TESTIMONY, supra note 54,
at 67-68, 86.
65. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 154.
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officials pressed hard for federal approval in late May meetings with
President Obama.66 Federal approval was eventually given, and the bill
sent to BP. In practice, only a small portion of the proposed berm project
was were completed before the discharge was contained. Little oil was
stopped; but the bill, for more than $220 million, was by far the costliest
containment measure per barrel of oil contained or removed.67 There
may have been good environmental reasons to build the berms, but
effective protection against oil pollution was not one of them.
IV. ACCURATE INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS
A. Source Control and Bad Information
Initial source control efforts focused on trying to make the blow-out
preventer (BOP) work as it should have in the first place.68 These efforts
were largely frustrated because the BOP had been altered in the field, but
the changes had not been recorded, resulting in control and closure
efforts focused on the wrong controls.69
Although BP acted quickly after the sinking to survey the damage to
the undersea well and related equipment, early BP and federal estimates
of the discharge volume and flow rate—initially reported as around
1,000 barrels a day, soon increased to 5,000 barrels a day—were
disastrously wrong, as the true figure was apparently nearer 60,000
barrels a day.70 Corrections to the 5,000 barrels per day estimate came
very slowly. It was not until late May that the federal government began
systematic efforts to evaluate these estimates.71 These later federal
efforts eventually resulted in the approximate 60,000 barrel per day
estimate.72
Admiral Allen testified that his decisions were unaffected by the bad
information about discharge rate because units were dispatched on the

66. Id. at 151.
67. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, THE STORY OF THE LOUISIANA BERMS PROJECT, STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 8,
39-40 (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Updated%20Berms%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
68. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 131.
69. Id. at 137-138.
70. Id. at 146.
71. Id. at 146-147.
72. Id. at 167.
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theory that everything available was needed, and that conditions could
grow worse quickly.73
But BP’s source control responses were apparently more adversely
affected by these mistaken figures. For example, BP’s early efforts to
put a containment dome on the discharge failed. The failure resulted in
large part because natural gas forms methane hydrate crystals at the
temperatures and pressures found at a 5,000 foot depth.74 BP
substantially underestimated the volume of hydrocarbons being
discharged, including methane, and so underestimated the methane
hydrate problem when it made its calculations for the containment
dome.75 While it is unclear if the containment dome could have
succeeded if the accurate information had been used, it is likely that had
BP used more accurate data, BP would instead have focused on more
promising approaches rather than the risky containment dome.76
The underestimated discharge volume also adversely affected the
“top kill” and “junk shot” efforts. “A top kill . . . involves pumping
heavy drilling mud into the top of the well through the BOP’s [Blow-out
Preventer] choke and kill lines, at rates and pressures high enough to
force escaping oil back down the well and into the reservoir.”77 BP
engineers used the 5,000 barrel per day figure in their planning; when the
actual figure was closer to 60,000 barrels.78 A BP engineer had
reportedly calculated that the effort would not work if the discharge
exceeded 13,000 barrels per day.79 By underestimating the discharge
volume, these efforts underestimated the pressure needed to stop the
discharge. These efforts failed.
Similarly, BP had too little collection capability at the well site to
handle the actual volume discharged once it was able to put the “top hat”
in place to funnel oil to collection vessels at the surface.80
73. ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 40-41. Other Coast Guard officers gave
similar testimony: Captain Stanton who had been at the command center in Houma,
Louisiana noted that Coast Guard policy was to mobilize very substantial resources to
make an overwhelming response. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 98-100.
74. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 145-46.
75. Id.
76. The National Commission noted that at one point the containment dome started to
float to the surface, buoyed by the large volume of hydrocarbons, including potentially
explosive methane. Id. at 146. One of the little noted achievements of the response
effort was its excellent safety record, particularly given the thousands of people and
vessels involved. STANTON TESTIMONY, supra note 17, at 56.
77. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 149.
78. Id. at 150.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 159.
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Whether BP could have made these earlier efforts succeed if it had
used the correct discharge volume information is debatable. The
containment dome available probably could not have been modified to
handle the larger discharge; it is unclear if enough pressure could have
been brought to bear for the “top kill” to succeed, even if correct figures
had been known. It is also unclear whether any additional production
vessels to collect and process the oil could have been deployed sooner.
It is very clear, however, that the dissemination of the early and
inaccurate information, BP’s reliance on these figures as the basis to
make several highly public but unsuccessful source control efforts, and
the grudging manner in which corrections were made, badly damaged
both BP’s and the federal government’s credibility. As a result, state and
local elected officials came under great pressure to do something else to
protect their constituents’ property and livelihoods, since the BP and
federal efforts had lost public confidence.
B. Technical Experts, Federal and Private
As the federal spill response effort floundered and as BP’s initial
efforts to control the well failed, President Obama asked Dr. Steven Chu,
Secretary of Energy and Nobel Prize winning physicist, to become
personally involved in the supervision of BP’s source control efforts.81
Dr. Chu made some significant contributions to the effort, such as the
suggestion to use gamma ray imaging of the blow-out preventer.82 He
also brought in many other highly capable federal scientists, who made
significant contributions.83
Secretary Chu’s involvement is a testament to his talent, skill, and
the great regard in which he is held. It made great journalism. It was
good politics, as it was an easily understood way to demonstrate the
President’s commitment to fixing the problem.
Sadly, it is also a searing indictment of the current system that it was
necessary to enlist the Secretary of Energy to do line-level scientific
oversight, when his statutory duties are to supervise a vast federal
scientific establishment, including the nation’s nuclear energy programs
and many national laboratories.
As the National Commission’s report makes clear, the MMS lacked
the expertise needed to oversee BP’s spill response.84 No other agency
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148.
NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 135-136.

2011]

Spills of National Significance and State Nullification

371

seemed to have that expertise either. Scientists and engineers from other
companies were also brought in to consult, but their role was unclear and
BP had legitimate concerns about conflicts of interest.85
The provisional company of federal scientists and engineers detailed
to the task, aided by outside scientists, eventually provided very good
technical oversight of BP’s decisions, but not until more than a month
had elapsed and much damage had occurred.86 According to the National
Commission’s report, their efforts were grafted onto the spill response
and their contributions unevenly shared with those who would have
benefited from their insights.87
V. BETTER SPILL RESPONSE AVOIDS NULLIFICATION
The problems identified by Admiral Allen and in the National
Commission’s report are very serious. These problems suggest that major
reforms are needed in the United States’ spill response system to avoid
repeating serious mistakes with the Deepwater Horizon when the next
spill of national significance occurs, particularly if it occurs in
connection with offshore oil and gas production. The needed changes,
however, require much less in the way of statutory revision than
revisions in the way the United States implements current legal
requirements.
A. Build Federal Scientific and Engineering Review Capability,
and Use It
The facility response plan for the Deepwater Horizon failed. That
failure did not result from an inadequate statutory requirement in the
Clean Water Act, but from the failure of those responsible for approving
the facility response plan to check its claims or assumptions properly
before doing so. Perhaps these failures occurred because those
responsible for approving it were not responsible for the spill response.
The plan’s claims about adequate response capability proved false when
they mattered most. Federal regulators need to be provided with the
personnel and expertise to conduct a serious review of these plans; that
capacity was plainly lacking for the Deepwater Horizon’s plan.
Current political attacks on federal employees’ pay, work ethic, and
professionalism, as well as current efforts to make wholesale cuts in
85. See, e.g., id. at 162.
86. See id. at 164.
87. Id. at 162.
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regulatory agencies, suggest that these problems will arise again unless
Congress recognizes that such shortcuts are dangerous and likely to cost
the country dearly in the long run. Here, the solution lies in the
appropriations and budget process much more than in any amendments
to OPA or section 311 of the Clean Water Act.
B. Engage State and Local Elected Leaders in Planning and Practicing
Spill Response
For a spill of national significance, the public expects their state and
local officials to become fully engaged in the response. In order for that
response to work well, these leaders need to be made an integral part of
the planning process. Right now, they are not. For these large scale spill
responses, the NCP should be revised to encourage active participation
by elected leaders in Area Contingency Plans and in key drills. Area
Contingency Plans can be revised to assure that they are better integrated
with state disaster preparedness procedures, such as activation of the
National Guard, and the exercise of other state and local emergency
powers to aid in response to major spills. Similarly, the NCP should be
revised to provide for regular Coast Guard cooperation with these elected
officials as a matter of course in the event of such a large scale spill.
These responses need to be practiced regularly if they are to work
well, just as hurricane responses are practiced annually in the Gulf. If
elected leaders are engaged as such, they will have ownership of the plan
and its response, and probably be more productive partners in the
response. Regular press coverage of these drills, noting the contributions
or absence of key elected leaders, will help establish a public expectation
of participation, one that can be turned into a political issue by opponents
if a leader skips these drills.
C. Provide for Rigorous Scientific and Engineering Oversight of
Responsible Party Response Operations
The jury-rigged scientific oversight pulled together by the federal
government in the Deepwater Horizon response underlined the need to
have these scientific review procedures established in advance, including
the assignment of key technical experts. Like other aspects of spill plans,
these assignments need to be updated frequently in order to work in an
emergency. Current responses could be substantially strengthened if a
similar requirement were imposed as part of area and facility response
plans, required to be updated periodically and tested annually by
regulators.

2011]

Spills of National Significance and State Nullification

373

Superfund, like OPA and section 311 of the Clean Water Act,
provides that responsible parties can take the lead in conducting removal
and responses actions.88 In order to do so under Superfund, however, the
statute requires that an oversight contractor be retained at the responsible
party’s expense in order to assist EPA in reviewing that response.89 That
approach can work under OPA, provided that such arrangements are
made in advance with reputable engineering firms approved by both the
Coast Guard and the Department of the Interior agency assigned to
review such spill response plans. Once again, updating these assignments
and testing them regularly will be essential to having them work in an
actual emergency.
D. Insist on Accurate and Independent Information About the Discharge
for Government Officials Making Decisions About the Response
The erroneous information about the most basic aspects of the
Deepwater Horizon discharge greatly damaged public confidence in the
response and helped push state and local governments to act
independently of established spill response mechanisms. The National
Commission has made detailed recommendations about steps to assure
adequate instrumentation of drilling equipment so that this problem is not
repeated.90 Similarly, detailed information about the as-built aspects of
the drilling operation needs to be accurate and readily available, to avoid
the “wheel-spinning” that occurred when the blow-out preventer controls
were modified on the Deepwater Horizon but the records were not
provided to those trying to operate it after the sinking.
Experience with this spill underlines the importance of having the
federal government independently verify critical information about the
spill, to do so early, and to update the information regularly. While an
oversight contractor can do much of the oversight of the responsible
party, this information is sufficiently critical to the response that the
federal government, probably through the Coast Guard, needs to develop
the capability to conduct its own assessments of spill conditions. This
means acquiring the remotely operated submersibles and key personnel
needed to operate them, as well as the expertise needed to evaluate the
results. That capability will be important to assure the public about the
accuracy of the information and to make sure responsible parties are not
ignoring or missing adverse information.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2006).
89. Id.
90. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 253.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Admiral Allen and the National Commission both have given the
country very thoughtful advice about how to avoid repeating the
Deepwater Horizon disaster. This article has focused on how these
lessons might be best applied in planning spill responses, so that the
United States can avoid committing similar mistakes when the next spill
of national significance occurs. Many of these changes can be
accomplished under existing law, provided that Congress and the
Administration recognize that much of the solution lies in carrying out
existing legal commitments with adequate resources and attention and
engaging state and local elected leaders as well as key federal officials.

